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IN THE SUPREME C.QURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
ALFR.ED R,OGER MOORE,
Respondent,
-vs.Case No. 8284

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD
C·O·MP ANY, a corporation,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF' RESPONDENT

PRELIMINAR.Y STATEMENT·
·The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
Throughout appellant's brief, isolated bits of testimony have been lifted out of context and given a meaning different than that intended by the witness. This is
especially true of Dr. Reed S. Clegg's testimony. Appellant's brief also contains many statements as fact which
were in serious dispute between the witnesses. Rather
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than to take the negative and defensive p-osition which
would be necessary in order to single out instance by instance these transgressions on the part of appellant
we shall m·ake a comprehensive statement of facts.
The event, resulting in injuries to pl·aintiff, occurred
while he was engaged in the performance of his duties
as a se:ction laborer at Range, ·Colorado, at approximately
3 :00 o'·clock p.m.. , on the 9th day of August, 1951.
His ·action was filed in the Third Judicial District
C·ourt, in and for Salt Lake County, St·ate of Utah, on the
1st day of F:ebruary, 19·53. The case was tried the first
time before Judge Clarence E. Baker, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $'12,500.00.
The trial court set aside this ver·dict and granted a new
trial. The case 0ame on for trial the second time before
Judge Martin M. Larson and on the 30th day of June,
1954 the jury returned a verdict in the net amount of
$17,500.00. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and subs.equently denied defendant's motion for a
new trial.
S.TATEMENT OFI FACTS .
A~fred

Roger Moore was 34 years of age at the time
of trial. He had had a tenth grade education (R. 9).
After leaving school his first job was that of feeding
cattle for a rancher at Greeley, Colorado (R. 9). Thereafte'r he sp·ent seven and a half years in the Navy as a
signalman (R. 10). After resigning from the Navy he
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worked for the American Express, handling shipments
(R. 10), and then {lor Blue Ribbon Bakers at Greeley,
Colorado carrying shipments and loading trucks (R. 11).
After that he spent two and one-half years working for
Benton Land & Livestock Company at Burns, C·olorado,
feeding livestock, pitching hay, shoveling and irrigating
(R. 11). Tlhereafter he leased several small places and
bought a small herd of sheep (R. 12). In March of 1950
he hired out as a section laborer for The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, at Burns, Colorado (R. 12). He was earning approximately $256.00
per month (R. 13). -t\,.s a section l~aborer his work consisted of raising track, handling ties, using a spike maul
and shoveling (R. 13). During the time that he worked
for the railroad company he handled his. sheep and irrigated his leased pasture lands during off hours (R. 14).
On August 9, 19·51 plaintiff's shift was 8 :00 a.m., to
4 :30 p.m. His particular assignment was at Range, Colorado, where he and one Lyle Nichols were cleaning a
rock slide. Nichols was. operating a Huff Loader and
plaintiff was located at a telephone where he would receive reports from the dispatcher as to any expected
movement along the track (R. 17). That morning Assistant Roadmaster Summerfield gave instructions to
Nichols and p'laint1ff to load the Huff Loader and a
Huff Loader wheel and tire, which was behind the tool
house at Range, Colorado, onto a flatcar and to have
this task done by 3 :00 to 3 :30 p.m. ( R. 20).
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·The Huff Loader wheel and tire weighed approxiniately 450 pounds (R. 24).
Nichols and p~laintiff rolled the wheel and tire from
behind the tooi house up along the track to where there
was a slope of ap·pro\Ximately 18 inches to a foot from the
ends of the ties to the ground (R. 21). They rolled the
wheel and tire upright onto the outer teeth of the Huff
Loader bucket. Plaintiff took a posit'ion in front of the
tire holding it up~right with his hands, and Nichols mounted the Huff Loader for the purpose of lifting the bucket.
The bucket lifted on an arc and a point would be reached
where the wheel and tire woul:d lay back against the end
of the bucket without h~aving to be manually held in that
p o:sition (R. 25-27). As the tire was being lifted Nichols
allowed the Huff Loader to suddenly and unexpectedly
back away from plaintiff, causing the tire and wheel to
fall out of the bucke~t. In trying to prevent the tire and
wheel from falling, plaintiff was caused to suffer a severe straining injury (R. 31, 32). At that time plaintiff
1

complained to Nichols that he had ''jerked a kink in my
back" (R. 32). The two men thereafter roiled the tire
and wheel into app~roximately the same position in the
bucket and on the roadbed. Nichols again lifted the
bucket but this time did not allow the Huff Loader to
back away from where plaintiff was holding the tire and
whe·el in position an!d the lifting of the tire and wheel
was accomplished without incident. After the tire had
been lifted high enough so that it laid back against the
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bucket, Nichols proceeded across the tracks to where the
flatcar was located and lowered the Huff Loader tire and
wheel onto the flatcar (R. 32, 33).
During this time plaintiff continued to experience
pain in his back (R. 34). When the other members of the
crew arrived he complained to Ernest E·. Foster, the
Assistant F·oreman, that he had injured his ba:ck (R. 34).
At the end of the shift plaintiff drove his automoibile
home. That evening he finished his chores but his hack
continued to give him such trouble that he was "up and
down all night" (R. 35).
The next work day plaintiff again reported for work
at Range, C·olorado. The condition of his back had remained about the same (R. 36).
The second work day following his injury he made
a report to George Collett, the foreman of the crew, and
received a slip to be examined by Dr. Thomas N. Sims
at Eagle, Colorado (R. 36, 37). Thereafter he received
treatments from Dr. Sims on several occasions. Following these treatments the pain in his back would seem to
ease up temporarily (R. 38).
Dr. Sims testified that he saw plaintiff on August
24, 1951, plaintiff told him that he had injured his back
"while attempting to tip a tire into a Huff Loader" and
the doctor found a "lesion" or "deviation from the normal" of the right hip (R. 224, 225).
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For a period of four to six weeks following his injury
plaintiff's back continued hurting him and he would
''·work a day or two and have· to lay off" (R. 37). Thereafter, because of the condition of his back, it was necessary for him to lay off work altogether (R. 38). F'ollowing his injuries he earned a total sum from the railroad
of between $100.00 and $150.00 (R. 38) .
.He continued to exp~erience extensive pain In his
hack, and in January of 195·2 he went to Glenwood
Springs to see Dr. Livingston. Dr. Livingston gave him
some pills and told him he was not to lift over five or
ten pounds for a year (R. 38, 39). For a time plaintiff
tried, with the assistance of his wife, to take care of his
sheep. He then sent them with another herd to the
desert (R. 39'). He was later obliged to sell them in July
of 1953 (R. 40).
In February or M·arch of 1952 he sought assistance
from Dr. Nutting at Glenwood Springs, Colorado (R. 40).
Thereafter in March of 1952 he was sent by the railroad
company to see Dr. Hines at D·enver, Colorado. Dr.
I-Iines in turn had him examined by Dr. Ellis, an orthopedic s-urgeon at Denver, Colorado. Dr. Ellis prescribed
the use of a canvas belt with heavy stays ('R.. 42). During this time plaintiff experienced extreme difficulty with
his back. He testified (R. 42) :
"Q.

A.

W'hat kind of

difficulty~

Well, I couldn't get out of bed in the morning
I felt like my legs were asleep, and if I hap:
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pened to turn over on my stomach in the
night, I couldn't hardly get turned back over.

Q. How do you sleep

nights~

A.

I finally took to sleeping on the floor on the
rug in the front room, where I could sleep.

Q.

Did you have a blanket over you~

A.

I had a sleeping bag; slept on the floor in a
sleeping bag.

Q.

Were you able to sleep well nights~

A.

No, I never have slept very well for the last
two years."

A month after he had seen Dr. Ellis, he again went
to Dr. Ellis' office and saw another doctor. Thereafter
he was sent to Salida, Colorado where he was examined
by Dr. Hoover, an orthopedic surgeon, and by Dr. F'uller
(R. 43). He continued to wear the canvas belt support
and to take hot baths (R. 43). In connection with his
wearing of the belt he testified that hy the time of
trial he had "nearly worn it out" (R. 156). On his own
initiative plaintiff sought medical assistance from a Dr.
Newman, another orthopedic surgeon, at Denver, Colorado. He likewise sought assistance from a Dr. Grant
Young, an orthopedist from Denver, Colorado (R. 44).
In the Fall of 1951 plaintiff "\vent hunting at Redwood, a!bout eight miles from his home. On this hunting
trip he experienced considerable difficulty with his back
( R. 45).

On one occasion in the year 1952 he at-

tended a Roping Club, to which he had belonged for a
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number of years. He caught one calf but the effort
bothere·d his back and he never again attempted to perform any roping (R. 45, 46). In 195·2 he went on an elk
hunt. lie had been unable to earn a living for some time
and needed the meat to aid in supporting his family (R.
46).
F'rom July to October, 1952 he worked stacking hay
to repay an indebtedness on his sheep (R. 47). The work
bothered his back considerably. In March and April of
1953 he drove truck for one Vern Davis, at Green River,
U ta'h, and earned approximately $400.00 (R. 48). He wa·s
forced to quit because of the condition of his back (R.
48, 126).
In May, June and July of 1953 he worked for C'ater
Construction

Company

and

earned

approximately

$500.00. The Cater Construction Company terminated
his employment because he was unable to work steady.
This job required him to do some shoveling and bending
over and his hack would not hold up under this typ·e of
work (R. 48, 130).
He was next employed by Deardon Lumber Company
at Burns, Colorado from the 1st of July, 1953 until the
lOth of March, 1954, but was unable to work steady because of his back condition. This work involved rolling
logs down a ramp with a cant hook and other forms of
physical a:ctivity. During an ordinary work week he
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would work two or three days and lay off a few days
(R. 49, 150). He described the effect on him of this
type work as follows (R. 50, 51):
"A. Well it seemed like my legs in the morning
- I could not get them to working for me,
whenever I would get up.

Q. How did your legs feel; can you describe it
for us~
A.

The bottom of my foot would get numb.

Q. Which
A.

foot~

And my leg down to my knee· was numb.

Q. Was it one leg more than another, or both
legs~

A.

Well, it seems like it was in my right leg
mostly, but it would switch once in a while
to my left leg. My left leg never bothered me
quite as much as my right leg.

Q. Was there a particular place or location in
your back, where you suffered from pain~
A.

No, always hurt; not bad, but always there;
just pains.

Q. Did you have any particular incident while
working for Deardon Lumber Company 1n
which you had spe'Cial difficulties~
A.

I passed out, I think, about three times..

Q.

F:rom what type of

A.

I was trying to turn a log once, and lifting,
and I passed out. The other two times I was
taking chains off the saw, and I passed out
when I went to push one down the runway

exertion~
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once. The other time I was-.had just brought
a heavy one over, and I leaned up· against the
pole until I got squared away.

Q. Did you cut yourself on one

occasion~

A. ·My legs give way on me once, and I cut my
hands. I slipped back against it.

Q. Do you have the scars you can show

us~

A. Yes.
Q. Will you step down and show the jury the
scars~

('Witness exhibiting scar to jury)"
During this eight month period of time he earned
ap~proximately $1000.00. If he had worked steady he
would have earned between $2000.00 and $2400.00 (R. 52).
His next employment was in
Decker Trucking Company, Green
oil truck driver. Up· to the time of
approximately $390.00 but testified
extreme diffi'Culty with his back on
(R. 53) :
''A.

May of 1954 with
River, Utah, as an
trial he had earned
that he was having
this job. He stated

Well, a week ago, I did not think I could stand
it very much longer, but the truck broke
·down. I have had a week's rest. I think I can
maybe take it for a few weeks m.ore."

In connection with motion pictures mentioned by appellant in its. brief that were surreptitiously taken of the
plaintiff whi[e working at the Deardon Lumber Company
he testifield (R. 151, 152) :
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"Q.

S·o that, the things you were doing in that
picture were not bona fide, and didn't actually
show you doing things you ordinarily do,
then~

A.

Not as I ordinarily do, no.

Q.

Well, in what respect were you not doing the
things as you ordinarily do~

A.

We were more or less putting on for these
pictures. They were supposed to be educational pictures, and I was to get a percentage
of what they were s.o[d for; I was tricked into
that, from a boy that was supposed to be from
Hollywood, that came from Grand J'unction,
at the request of the railroad, to take these
pictures."

At the time the pictures were taken Moore was wearing the canvas belt (R. 166).
Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that he examined plaintiff on January 30, 1953 (R.
59, 60), and March 2, 1954 (R. 61). Plaintiff gave a history of injury to his lower spine. Dr. Clegg found muscle
spasm of the involuntary objective type in the lumbo
sacral spine (R. 60, 61). Dr. Clegg also testified (R.. 61):
"A.

There was a slight sensory loss, or sensory
dimunition on the latera~ side, or outside of
the inner or medial side of the right foot.
doctor~

Q.

What does that indicate, please,

A.

This represents irritation of nerves which
com.e out of the lower sp,in,e, and extend into
the legs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Q.

Could you tell us what was causing that irritation~

A.

I had my-

Q.

Do you have an

A.

Yes.

Q.

Will you give us. your opinion~

A.

I f~lt, with the other findings such as limitation of straight leg raising, and limitation
of forward flexion, in an attempt to touch
the floor without bending the knees, and with
the very slight variation, slight x-ray changes
that were present, and followilng the subs,equent examination on the 2nd· of March, 1954,
it was my opinion that Mr. Moore had irritation of the. nerves of the lower spine, which
radiate into both legs, especially on the left
side."

opinion~

T he x-rays, to which the doctor referred, were "essentially normal except for very slight narrowing of the
lumb~o s:a:cral joint'' (R. 62,. 63). The doctor was asked
a hypothetical question and gave answers as follows (R.
1

63-67) :

"Q. Doctor, assuming this man was injured on
August 9, 1951, an·d he was in the p~rocess of
loading a big heavy tire, weighing anywhere
from 3 to 5 hundred pounds, on to a sort of a
shovel, that came down and caught much of
ihe w·eight in his arms, causing him to lean
over to the s~ide, and he felt a sharp pain in his
back, assuming that he had not had any
trouble with his back before that time, assuming these things., and what you found on your
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examination, would you have an opinion as to
whether this condition you found in his ba:ck,
was caused by the accident which I referred
to~

A.

I do.

Q. What is your
A.

opinion~

All I could say is that it is possible that the·
accident could either initiate it or -"

After objection of counsel and discussion with the
Court the witness was allowed to explain his previous
answer and particularly the use of the word "possible"
as fo[lows (R. 64):
"A.

In medicine, we cannot come out definitely
on things, very often and say absolutely definitely that such-and-such a condition is soand-so, but we usually qualify our diagnosis,
because sometimes we get fooled, and we use
the word 'possible' and that is all I can state.
I cannot say definitely that this is probably
or definitely that it is. It is just a possible
condition; that was my opinion.
*

Q.

*

*

*

Now do you have an opinion as to what is
causing this nerve irritation as you describe
1"t OJ.

A. I do.
Q. Will you give us your opinion on that~
A. Again it is a p·ossibility. It is my opinion
that this is possibly due to pressure on the
nerve in the lower spine, due to irritation
from a disc.
* * * *
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Q.

{Mr. Roberts) Now I am won·dering, Doctor,
if you could step down here to the Board and
make a little ·diagram or drawing of what this.
disc thing is, so that we can get some kind of
a picture of it. Make the lines definite, please,
they are a little hard to see on that Board.
*

A.

*

*

*

Between these vertebra is a cushion, or
a disc, as it is called, which is gristle, or cartilage ma,terial, and its actual function is as a
shock absorber. Sometimes this cushion pinches ag1ainst t:he nerve going down the leg, and
that is a P'ossibility of what has occurred in
this case, t.hat the disc has cause:d the irritation of the nerve, and charaC'teristically this
condition has exacerbations ·arnd remissioVJVS.
You .have at~acks of pam and it heals up.

'* * *

From the knowledge that I can gather from
hearsay, from the physical findings, I felt
that irritation of the nerve 1nay very well be
from this disc p·ressing against the nerve; as
I brought out, that irritatiotn, possibly the
disc, has removed suffiqiently the pressure,
·and it has been imp·roved.

Q.

From your examinati-on of this man, X-raysdo you have .an opitn.ion as to whether or not
he has Otny p-er·manent disability as a 'result
of this condition iln his back?

A. I do.
Q.

What is your opinion of it, doctor?

A.

It is my opinion that he has a 5% disabilitypermanent disability.
* * * *
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Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
there will be this continued, what you call
irritation~

A.

The exacerbation, remission.

Q. What does that

mean~

A.

That means the condition gets worse, perhaps
the disc irritates over a period of time, and
he ha~ p~in, and then it clears up, and he has
a remission.

Q.

Do you have an opinion as to whether that
will continue on through life~

A.

I do.

Q. What is your
A.

opinion~

I base the fact that this. possibility to have
subsequent attacks, subsequent exacerbations
and remissions, as forming part of the reason
for giving him the 5% permanent disability."

In connection with disc injuries generally he testified on redirect examination as follows (R. 81) :

''Q.

Your disc injury is caused more by wh!at
type of thing, than would be the fracture of
the back~

A.

The disc injury represents a soft tissue between the fractures; it occurs usually where
there has been no fracture or break in the
bone, but when there has been disease or injury or strain of the soft tissues, and not
sufficient to break the bone but to tear or
strain the soft tissues.

Q.

In connection with your findings here on the
x-rays, whi0h you have indicated, and also on
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the pattern of the pa1n, and the sensory
change which you found, are all of those
things consistent~

A.

Yes."

In connection with plaintiff's condition he testifie'd
(R. 76):

''Q. Now these conditions, do they tend to correct
themselves, doctor, where the
not serious~

A.

~onditions

are

They are charact.eristically intermittent and
fleetifn.g, they come and go, and we cannot
always prescribe just what the future will
bring."

STATEMENT OF· POINT·s.
POINT' I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRU·CTION NO. 16.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 13.

POINT IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION OR
PREJUDICE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

Defendant starts out with the proposition that it
was the burden of plaintiff to prove damages with "reasonable certainty." Some courts require plaintiff to
establish damages with that degree of proof. Utah has
expressly repudiated that rule and permits plaintiff

to~..

cover such damages as he ma.y "I)robably" suffer.
In Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173
Pac. 900, the jury was instructed that plaintiff could
recover for physical pain and mental anguish he would
probably endure in the future, and for the earnings he
would probably lose in the future. This instruction was
held correct and the Court stated (p. 902):
"In support of this assignment appellants
concede that damages may be allowed in cases of
this kind for future pain and suffering and for
future loss of time; but they insist that the jury
should be limited in awarding the damages for
such future pain and suffering or loss of time as
is reasonably certain from the evidence the plaintiff will suffer in the future. They object to the
jury speculating as to the pain and suffering he
will probably hereafter endure and the time he
will probably hereafter lose."
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In referring to cases cited by the defendant in support of its contention that damages should be proved to
a reasonable ~certainty the 'Court stated (p. 902) :
"Some of these authorities apparently sup'"'
p~ort app·ellants' contention, while others are clearly distinguished from the p-resent case. We think
there is a clear distinction between that which
'may happen' and that which 'will proba;bly happen.' The former may imply a mere possibility,
while the latter implies that which is likely to
·happen. This distinction, in effect, is recognized
by many of the authorities. The rule invoked by
appellants calls for a higher degree of certainty
than is ordinarily required in civil cases. It is
quite true the jury should n~ot be permitted to indulge in mere speculation in endeavoring to determine the rights of litigants. It do:es not follow,
however, that because they cannot demo'YIJStrate
their conclusions with mathematical p·re:cision that
therefore their conclwsions are invalid. Even in
attempting to determine the damages. already sustained in cases of this kind, jurors, in the very
nature of things, are confronted with more or less
uncertainty. That which is most likely, or that
which is prohabie in the light of all the evidence,
is oftentimes the only practical guide. If a higher
degree of certainty than this is required, it is
manifest that great hards~hip and injustice will result in many cases. Of course, the probability here
referred to should not he a mere conjectural probability, but one based on evidence. The jury,
whose duty it is to ascertain and declare the truth
from ·conflicting testimony, should accept that
which is probably true as against that which is
less probable. In doing so the juror keeps within the law ap·plicable to civil cases. He should ac-
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cep1t that which he believes to be t.rue, notwithstanding it may be more or less uncertailn."
The Court also stated (p. 902) :

"* * * After all, it is merely a question of
belief, founded on substantial evidence, and not
on conj eeture. That, it seems to us, is all that
should be required."
After referring to cases cited by plaintiff the Court
conclude'd (p. 902) :
"These authorities sustain the position of
respondent. The doctrine they enunciate is in
harmony with our own views and with the practice generally which prevails in the trial of civil
cases. If jurors are made to understand that
their conclusions must be based upon substantial
evidence actual~y introduced (and they generally
are so instructed), we see no reason why a distinction should be made as to the degree of certainty between a case of this kind and any other ordinary civi~l case. Appellant's exception to the instruction is not sustained."
This case was followed in Kirchqestn.er v. Denver
& R. G. W. R. Co., 118 Utah 20, 218 P. 2d 685. The Court

stated ( p. 693) :
"There was no error in instructing the jury
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for all
pain and suffering that he 'will probably endure'
in the future. The defendant's contention that
the jury should have been instructed that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for only
such future pain and suffering as the evidence
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establishes with 'reas-onabie certainty' was rejected by this court in Picino V'. Utah A.p,ex Mining Co. et al., 52 Utah 338, 173 P. 900, 902. There
this court approved an instruction allowing the
jury in assessing damages to consider the physical and mental pain and suffering which the p~lain
tiff 'will probably hereafter endure.' "
T'here is no question that expert testimony may
be introduced that certain acts coul~d he or might be the
cause of a physical condition. In Jackson v. Harries,
65 Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, the doctor testified as follows
(p. 237) :

"* * * 'I don't know horw long such a condition as I find in Mrs. Jackson might exist. It
might be for a short while fo~lowed by recovery;
or it might be pr·olonged over many years. This
is something that time alone will tell. A person
under these conditions suffers pain -may suffer
pain, and there is very much mental distress.'

.
* * *"

He also testified that Mrs. J aekson's inability to
perform household labor, etc., "woul'd follow, or might
follow, as a result of the condition which I have described." Another doct~or was asked whether or not the
conditions he found in Mrs. Jackson could have .been
caused by the actions of the officers, and he answered
(p. 237) :

,, '* * * 'I believe it could. I believe that shock
of sufficient nature could cause all these symptoms that you have spoken of and the hysterical
manifestations that I found upon her examination.' "
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Defendants ma:de proper objections to the foregoing
testimony and the objections were overruled. In explaning defendants' position the Court stated (p. 237) :
"The objection is that they call for testimony
which is immaterial and inc-ompetent. The argument is made that the experts are called because
they are supposed to be competent to express an
opinion, having probative value, as to the real
cause of the plaintiff's condition; and that, to
support the charge that defendants are responsible for that condition, the expert opinion should
be addressed to the conclusion as to whether or
not defendants' acts were the cause thereof. If
the expert could not say that in his opinion the
acts complained of did or did not cause the injury,
then his testimony was without value, being mere
speculation and conjecture, and affording no basis
for an award of damages."
The Court then stated (p. 237) :
"But the overwhelming weight of authority
is against appellants' position upon this point,
and is in support of the rule that it is proper to put
such questions in the form used in this case, so
as to obt~ain the opinion of the expert witness as
to w·hether or not the: !acts assumed could be or
might be the cause of the condition descr·ibed,
and leavilng it to the jury to say whether or not
they were in fact the cause thereof. These cases,
it seems to us, are supported by the better reason."
The Court concluded (p. 238) :
''There was no error in the c·ourt overruling
the objections to the questions above mentioned
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p·ropounded to the me·dical experts. For them to
give the opinion that the condition of the plaintiff as describe'd and assumed in the questions
could or might be the result of the assumed cause
establishes a fact, if their testimony be credited
by the jury, from which the latter might, when
considering it in connection with all the other evi·dence in the case hearing upon the point, conclude
that the assumed cause was the real cause of the
injury."
By its requested Instruction N·o. 16 defendant asked
that the jury ·be instructed to the effect that no c-ompetent evidenee had been received upon which a finding
could be made that plaintiff sustained a ruptured intervertebral disc an'd therefore they should disregard any
contention made by plaintiff that he sustained a disc
InJury
Under the evidence introduced in this case the fact
that plaintiff may have suffered a ruptured intervertebral disc cannot be eliminated from the case·. Every
symptom and circumstance was consistent with the existence of a ruptured disc (R. 81). By this instruction defendant sought to eliminate any consideration of this
testimony which defendant concedes was prop·erly admitted in evidence.
The Court, in its Instruction No. 25 (R. 315), set
forth the ele1nents to be considered by the jury in computing damages, and a ruptured intervertebral disc was
n·ot mentioned. The elements set forth upon which dam-
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ages could be returned were for pain and suffering, both
mental and physical, past and future; loss of bodily function, past and future; lost earnings, and impairment of
earning capacity.
The evidence established that Dr. ·Clegg was of the
opinion that the condition from which plaintiff suffered
was an irritation of the nerves which come out of the
lower spine and extend into the legs.
After testifying to the existence of an involuntary
muscle spasm in the muscles of p~laintiff's back the doctor testified as follows (R. 61) :

"Q.
A.

Go ahead and tell us what you found.
There was slight sensory loss, or sensory
dimunition on the lateral side, or outside of
the inner or medial side of the right foot.

Q. What does that indicate, please,
A.

Doctor~

This represents irritation of nerves which
come out of the lower spine, and extend into
the legs.

* * * *
Q. Do you have an

opinion~

A. Yes.
Q. Will you give us your opinion~
A.

I felt, with the other findings such as limitation of straight leg raising, and limitation of
forward flexion, in an attempt to touch the
floor without bending the knees, and with
the very slight variation, slight x-ray changes
that were present, and following the subse-
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quent examination on the 2nd of March, 1954,
it was my opinion that Mr. Moore had irritation of the nerves of the lower spine, which
radiate into both legs, especially on the left
side."
F·rom this testimony there can be no question that
the jury could find that the plaintiff was suffering from
this nerve irritation. The testimony of p~laintiff confirms
this nerve injury (R. 50).
T'he next

p~roposit~on

would be to determine whether

or not there wa.s a causal relationship between the falling
of the wheel onto plaintiff and this irritation of the
nerves. Dr. Clegg testified concerning the relationship
'between the falling of the wheel and the condition he
found in plaintiff's back. He testifie·d (R. 63):
"A.

All I could say is that it is possible that the
accident could either initiate it or-"

An objection was ma:de to the use of the word "possible" and the doctor then explained what he meant by
this term as follows (R. 64):
''A.

In medicine, we cannot come out definitely
on things, very often and say absolutely definitely that such-and-such a condition is soand-so, but we usually qualify our diagnosis,
because sometimes we get fooled, and we use
the word 'possible' and that is all I can state.
I cannot say definitely that this is probably
or definitely that it is. It is just a possible
condition; that was my opinion."
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On cross examination he further made explanation
of his use of this term as follows (R. 73) :

"Q.

And your diagnosis is such a possibility,
doctor, of course, as you have indicated, from
the history and also the findings you also
made in your office, that is right, isn't it~

A.

Yes, it is still a possibility; you cannot say
absolutely and definitely."

When asked to give his opinion on what was causing
this nerve irritation he answered (R. 65) :
"A.

Again it is possibility. It is my opinion that
this is possibly due to pressure on the nerve
in the lower spine, due to irritation from a
disc."

He also testified (R. 66) :

"* * *

I felt that irritation of the nerve may
very well be from this disc pressing against the
nerve; as I brought ·out, that irritation, possibly
the disc, has removed sufficiently the pressure,
and it has been improved."
On cross examination Dr. Clegg testified that in
passing him physically for work as a prison guard he
would pass him if his employers would accept the fact
that he would be slightly handicapped and occasionally
would have attacks when he w·ould be fairly handicapped
(R. 76). I-Ie stated that the condition of plaintiff was
"characteristically intermittent and fleeting, they come
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and go, and we cannot always prescribe just what the
future will bring." Concerning the disc he testifie·d (R.

81):
"Q. In connection with your findings here on
the X-rays, which you have indicated, and also
on the p·attern of the pain, an~d the sensory
change which you found, are all of those
things consistent~
A. Yes.

Q. Do you have an op·inion as to whether or not
they are consistent with a ruptured
A.

disc~

Yes, I feel consistent."

When we consideT the foregoing testimony with the
testimony of plaintiff that his back had never been injure-d before and that he had never had a lame or sore
back, or ever h·ad any treatment for it (R. 16), together
with his testimony that from the time the wheel fell onto
his arm, he experienced pain in his back which was continuous and had never left him from that time until the
time of the trial, we have un~der the cases sufficient evidence to establish the causal relation between the falling
of the whee[ an'd the injuries to plaintiff.
(a) There was sufficient evidence of the existence

of a d.isc injury to g-o to the jury.
As pointed out a1bove, the ultimate injury which
p·laintiff suffered from the fall of the wheel was the
irritation to the nerves at the lower back. The specific
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condition causing this nerve injury was really immaterial
if the injury was caused by the dropping of the wheel
on plaintiff.
l:q referring to the disc injury the doctor was merely
referring to the condition which might he causing the
nerve root irritation. ~,he testimony of the doctor shows
that he was not using the word "possible" as a lay person or lawyer would ordinarily use it. He expressly
stated that inasmuch as he could not definitely and possitively state that a -certain condition existed he of necessity had to revert to the use of "possible." He also expressly stated that all of the symptoms were consistent
with the existence of the disc. No other cause for this
nerve irritation was suggested.
In Sharp v. Esso Sta;ndard Oil Co., (La.), 72 So. 2d
601, the court expressed the modern view in weighing
medical testimony when the medical expert uses words
such as ''possible," "probable," "could," "might," and
the like. The court held that it should not try to draw
a distinction between the doctor's choice of "possible"
as against "probable," but should apply a common sense
viewpoint to the testimony as a whole. That case was
a suit for workmen's compensation for death. The decedent was an assistant operator in a refining company
and on N ove1nber 13, 1950 left the control room to open
a valve. No other employee was with him at the time.
He apparently opened the valve and was then unable
to close it. He called for assistance. The tower ulti-
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mately had to be shut down so the va~lve could he closed.
The incident caused decedent some excitem.ent. He had
a cyanotic ap,pearance according to his co-employees.
IThe next incident occurred December 13, 1950 when
dece dent walked into the eontrol room almost out of
breath, complaining of pain in his chest, exhibiting a
cyanotic app·earance, and collapsed. He was taken to a
hospital and later sent home. His family physician discovered he had suffered a he-art attack and he was returned to the hospital and treated. until January 14, 1951.
H·e was unable to work until his death, October 19, 1951.
The questions presented were whether or not the accrdent
experienced by decedent, November 13, 1950, followed
by the heart attack of Decem~ber 13, 1950 had any causal
connection with the disability occurring during his employment with defendant and if it was a cause of the
heart attack suffered by dece'dent October 19, 1951. The
doctor testified as foJlows :
1

"Q.

A.

Then you are saying that such an occasion,
under the circumstan·ce as I have related to
you, could bring about an injury to the heart
and he bad on it~ Is that right, sir~
That's within the reahn of possibility. Yes,
I think it is within the realm of possibility.

* * * *
Q.

And a thrombosis of that nature (non-symptomatic) could have occurred on November 13,
t9·50~

A.

Oh, yes, it is within the realm of possibility.
I don't believe it did from the evidence submitted."
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The Court stated:
"We know medical science knows more about
these things than we do, and our experience ha.s
been, from hearing testimony of this kind, that
when a doctor says possible or probable, he does
not mean that it did not happen as contended in
the sense that an ordinary layman would understand his words. In giving their testimony, all
medical experts try to give guarded testimony,
and some courts try to draw a distinction between
possibilities and proba:bilities. To our way of
thinking and to the modern trend of the courts
in considering these terms, we should look at
them in a common-sense way."
The Court quoted 2 La.rson, W orlunen's Compensation Law, p. 322, as follows:
'' 'The distinction between probability and
possibility should not follow too slavishly the
witnesses' choice of words, as sometimes happens
in respect to medical testimony. A doctor's use
of such words as 'might,' 'could,' 'likely,' 'possible'
and 'may have', coupled with other credible evidence of a non-medical character, such as a sequence of symptoms or events corroborating the
opinion, is sufficient to sustain an award. It is
a common experience of compensation and personal injury law-yers to find that the more distinguished a medical witness is the more tentative
and qualified are his statements on the witness
stand. He will testify that the sledge-hammer
blow on claimant's head might have caused claimant's headache, but hesitates to say positively that
this was the only possible cause, and may concede
on cross-examination that there could conceiv-
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ably he other causes. The weight of such testimony, however, should not be too sharply discounted because of the disposition of the highlytrained scientific mind to refrain from unqualified
statements or opinions on such matters as causation.' "
'The Supreme C·ourt of the United States in Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S-. 645, 653, 66 S.. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed.
916, recognized that some speeulation is necessary in all
situations where evidence must ·be considered. That
Court stated :
"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever
facts are in disp-ute or the .evidence is such that
fairminded men may draw different inferences,
a measure of sp•eculation and conjecture is require-d on the part of those whose duty it is to
settle the disp·ute by choosing what seems to them
to be the. most reasonable inference."
Our Court has recognized this same situation and
we specifically refer to the italicized portions of the
quotations from the Picino and Jackson cases, supra.
It is unnece'ssary for a doctor to state with mathematical
certainty the existence of a condition in order to find
that it existed. As was stated in Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, "Even
doctors have no television of the pathological history
of the insi'de of a man." From all the doctor could determine the symptoms of a disc were present when he considered the entire pricture, but inasmuch as he coul'd be
wrong he used the term "possibility." A common sense
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interpretation of his testimony leads to the conclusion
that the most probable thing which was causing the nerve
root irritation was a ruptured disc.
We submit that the evidence was sufficient to justify the court in refusing to eliminate all consideration of
what might be causing the nerve irritation which was
the important condition. Whether or not the disc was
causing the nerve irritation would not eliminate the fact
that the nerve irritation could be found to be present
un'der Dr. Clegg's testimony above quoted.
('b) The evidence Wias sufficient to sho·w .a causal
connection betwe.en the falling of the wheel on plaintiff
a.nd the itnjuries he suffered and from which he con-tinued to suffer 1J!Jttil the time of trial.

The medical testimony was not the only testimony
introduced concerning the causal connection between
plaintiff's injury and the falling of the wheel. Plaintiff
testified that on August 9, 1951 he was engaged in loading a wheel, weighing from 400 to 500 pounds, onto a
Huff Loader (R. 24). Immediately upon the wheel falling upon him he felt pain in his back (R. 31) and from
that time until the time of trial his back continued to hurt
him. His back hurt him the rest of the day (R. 34) and
was still hurti'njg him when he got home. fie couldn't sleep
very well that night (R. 35), and on the next work day
his back continued to hurt him (R. 36). F'or the next
four to six weeks he worked a day or two and then would
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have to lay ·off on account of his back (R. 37). His back
bothered him in every activity which he pursue'd (R. 45,
47-49). It was hard for him to get his legs going in the
morning; the bottom of his foot would get numb; his leg
to his knee was numb. This condition was mostly in his
right leg, but sometimes would switch to his. left leg.
I-Iis back pained continuously (R. 50).
Under the Utah cases a finding that the back nerve
irritation was caused by the falling of a wheel was supported by the foregoing evidence.
In Ut.ah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah
26, 126 P. 2'd 1070, the deceased, while in the course of
his employment, slip,p·ed from a saw horse causing him
to fall and strike his right testicle on the hiar he was
using or on a piece of coal. The fall caused a contusion
on his right testicle. Deceased continued to work from
January 3, 19'41, the date on which he fell, to January
14, 1941, when the pain became so severe he was forced
to stop work. He was sent to the hospital February 1,
1941 and died May 3, 19·41. An autopsy was performed
and the cause of death was diagnosed as "primary carcinoma of right testicle with carcinomatosis." An award
for his window an·d children was affirmed. The Court
stated ('p·. 29) :
"·As the commission in'dicated in its findings,
the deceased was probably suffering from carcinoma at the time of the trau1na.. Dr. Ogilvie's
testimony establishes the cause of the death of the
deceased as 'primary carcinoma of the right tes-
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ticle with carcinomatosis,' but as to the question
of the injury accelerating the pre-existing cancerous condition, the doctor refused to speculate,
stating that 'sometimes trauma greatly accelerates the growth of cancer but sometimes it does
not.' The medical profession has been unable
definitely to determine the cause and cure of
cancer. The profession is hesitant to make any
positive statements concerning it. We have here
a situation in which the deceased received an injury to his right testicle. Swelling and pain immediately developed which became progressively
worse, ending with the death of the deceased. The
circumstantial evidence indicates that the injury
aggravated and accelerated the cancerous condition contributing to the death of the deceased.
This is the more probable and rational explanation of the factors leading up to the death of the
deceased."
The Court also stated (p. 30):

"* * *

In this case there is no medical evidence on the question of whether the effect of the
blow accelerated the pre-existing condition; the
doctors refusing to spectula te (sic) but the Commission drew the 'inference that there was a
definite connection between the blow and the
acceleration of the condition, because apparently
the acceleration did 'begin with that event."
The Court also stated (p. 30) :

"* * *

The physicians testified that the accident could or might have had that effect. We
do not think it is necessary for an applicant to
procure a doctor who will make a positive statement where it is obvious that no positive state-
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ment could be expected. Even d·octors have no
television of the p~athological history of the inside of a man. When the event of accident is
definite and injures a particular member or
part of the body and afterward disability or
death occurs and the progression toward disa'bility
or death can definitely be ·ascertained as beginning
with the form.er event because the history of the
p-rogression ·directly involves a worsening of
the member or part to which the injury occurred
or the evidenee involves a connection between
the trauma and other affected parts in the history
of the p-rogressive worsening, there will be sustaining evidence for an award."
In Salt £,ake ·City v. Industrial Com.mission, 104
Utah 436, 140 P. 2·d 644, medical testimony would not support a causal relation betwe·en a blow in the eye from a
handball and sarcoma, which necessitated removal of
the eye, but. the sequence of events did and an award in
favor of the workman was sustained. After discussing
the medical testimony and definitely holding that it would
not :alone supp·ort the award the Court then starts to
trace the sequence of events as a result of which it held
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of
causal relationship· 'between the blow and the sarcoma.
The 'Court stated (p. 444):
"The sequen·ce of events to which the commission referred were brought out by the testimony of the applicant. According to this testimony he was struck in the eye by a handball in
October, 1940. At this time he suffered considerable pHin, the eye~ball became bloodshot, and the
area around the eye became discolored. In a:bout
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two or three weeks these outward signs of the· injury disappe'ared. About a month after the injury
the eye began to water and mucus would collect
in the eye. Some six months later the applicant
had difficulty in reading because his vision would
blur. This impairment of vision became progressively worse. Within a period of a little over a
year from the date of the injury, it became necess·ary to remove the eye because of this malignant
growth."
'After citing and quoting from the Utah Fuel Company case, supra, the Court continued (p. 445):
"The applicant relies on our holding in the
Utah Fuel case in support of his position here, but
it is doubtful that this case can on its facts be
brought within the rule laid down in the Utah
Fuel ease. The 'bridging symptoms. are not nearly
so convincing in this ease for after all outward
signs of the eye injury had disappeared there was
a period of from one to six months during which
there was no trace of this injury. Then the eye
began to water and the vision became impaired
because ·of this malignant growth which eventually
caused the loss of the eye.
"Yet, even though these bridging symptoms
are not so strong as those involved in the Utah
Fuel case, they do have certain probative value.
Here is a rather severe injury to the eye. Within
six months a malignant growth had developed
to such an extent that it impaired the applicant's
vision."
·Other courts have sustained this same rule.
In Glen L. Wigton Motor Co. v. Phillips, 163 Okl.
160, 21 P. 2d 751, an Industrial ·commission award to
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a workman was affirmed. The testimony wa.s to the
effect that he was industrially blind. His eyeball was cut
in three places and failing sight started at that time.
The court stated (p. 753) :
., 'The record discloses that Dr. Brown finds
that the loss of vision of right eye is 66.8, and that
this loss of vision might 'be attributable to the
injury. Dr. ·Shelton concludes that there could be
astigmatism from a traumatic injury. Dr. Hicks
testified that the loss of Vision might be produced
by the injury if the attending physician's report
was correct. There is nothing in this record to
indicate the attending physician's report was not
correct.
"Emphasis has been made in the brief of
petitioners relative: to the testimony of Dr. Brown
that the injury received might have caused the
resulting disability, and that such evidence is conjectural, speculative, and not sufficient upon which
to base an award by the State Industrial Commission.
''This court in the case of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Snapp·, 149 Okl. 51, '299 P. 137, 138, in
the third paragraph of the syllabus, said : 'Evidence that an employee's sight in one eye began
to fail shortly after an injury to the other eye,
and that the condition might have resulted from
the injury, is sufficient to support a finding by
the State Industrial Commission that the injury
did result therefrom.' In this connection, see, also,
Indiana Power & Wa.ter ~co. v. Miller, 73 Ind. App.
521, 127 N.E. 837."
The law is clear that it is not necessary to have positive or any expert testimony of the causal relationship
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between accident and disability. See Schultz v. Pivar,
370 Pa. 271, 88 A. 2d 74, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1327, wherein a
pedestrian fell into a manhole and hurt his back. It was
held that the jury could assess damages for disability
for a reasonable time in ihe future without medical testimony of the duration or extent of that time. The Court
said {p. 1333) :
''But no expert testimony was here needed to
establish causal relationship between disability
and accident. Wher,e 'there is such close connection between the accident and the injury as to
satisfy a reasonable person as to the cause of the
injury, the relation between the two is sufficiently
shown.'"
We submit there was no prejudicial error in the
refusal of the eourt to grant plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 16.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

The trial court's Instruction No. 12, given at plaintiff's request, charged the jury as follows (R. 304) :
"That at the time of the occurrence involve'd
in this case plaintiff, Alfred Roger Moore, and
defendant were mutually engaged in interstate
commerce.
"Under such circumstances the statutes of the
States of Utah a:nJd Colorado covering employers'
liability and workman's compensation are not ap-
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·plica:ble to this case and p~ain tiff's right to recover, if any he has, is based solely on the ·Statutes
of the United States covering the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees for
injuries caused while in the course of their employment."
There can be no doubt that the above quoted instruction correctly states the law.
The S·upreme Court of the United ·States, in the
case of New York Cen.tral R. Co. v. Winfield, 2·44 U.S.
147, 37 S. Ct. 546, 547, stated:
"It is settled that under the commerce clause
of the Constitution c,ongress may regulate .the
obligation of common carriers and the rights of
their employees arising out of injuries sustained
by the latter where both are engaged in interstate
commerce; and it also is settled that when Congress acts upon the subject all state laws covering the same field are necessarily superseded by
reason of the supremacy of the national authority.
'Congress acted upon the subject in passing the
Employers' Liability Act, and the extent to which
that act covers the field is the point in con troversy. By one side it is said that the act, although
regulating the liability or obligation of the carrier and the right of the employee where the injury results in "\\Thole or in part from negligence
attributable to the carrier, does not cover injuries occurring· without such negligence, and therefore leaves that class of injuries to be dealt with
by state laws; and by the other side· it is said that
the act covers both classes of injuries and is exclusive as to both. * * *
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"In our opinion the latter view is right and
the other wrong."
See also Pritt v. West Virginia N. R. Co., 51 ·s.E:.
2d 105, 6 A.L.R. 2d ·5;62, 576 '(decided Dec. 14, 1948) (certiorari denied by United States Supreme 'Court 69 S. Ct.
891, 336 U.S. 961, 93 L. Ed. 1113), where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated:

"* * * The C:ongress of the United States
having power to ·enact the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, its. terms controlled all employment in interstate commerce, and our ·State ~Com
pensation Act could in no way affect the force
and effect of the FedeTal Act."
See also to the same effect So~t.th Buffalo Ry. Co. v.
Ahern, 344 U.S. 367,73 S. ·ct. 340 (decided Jan.19, 19·5:3).
Instructions similar to Instruction No. 12 have fbeen
customarily given by the trial courts of this jurisdiction
for many years. The purpose of the instruction is obvious. Alm·ost every jury panel is composed of men and
women who are familiar with the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the state. They are well aware of the fact
that employees of the various industries within this
state, who are injured in the course of their employment,
are able to obtain redress against their employers under
the Workmen's Compensation Act by resorting to the Industrial Commission.
As counsel for injured railroad employees we have
on a number of occasions where an instruction such a.s
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Instruction No. 12 has not been give~, later been confronted with questions from jurors asking why the employee has brought a ease before a court and jury when
he is eligible to receive or ha._s received workmen's compensation.
Naturally, this ty·p·e of reasoning would he highly
prejudicial to the railroad employee in view of the fact
that the law affords him no remedy other than by resort
under the Federal E:mployers' Liability Act to the courts
of general jurisdiction.
A minimmn standard of fair play would seem to demand that an injured workman be protected by court
instruction from any risk of injustice that may come from
such misunderstandings as to the law.
At page 28 of its hrief, ap·peMant suggests that
State Workmen's ·Compensation laws are a form of insuranee, -and that Instruction No. 12 in effect in'Structed the
jury that plaintiff was not covered by nor entitled to receive insurance procee:ds as a result of his injuries. The
great bulk -of litigation in connection with the right of injured employees to recover under the Workmen's Compensation laws of the various states, 2253 p·ages in the

4th American Decennial Digest and 3452 pages in the
5t.h Ame:ricam Decemnial Digest, would certainly indicate
that the Workmen's C·ompensation laws ·do not insure
employees. In this connection it is interesting to note the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
language of Mr. J'u'Stice Murphy in Ca~rd,illo v. Liber'ty
Mut. Ins. Co., (decided Mar. 10, 19'47), 330 U.S. 469, 67
S. Ct. 801, 807:

"* * * The statutory phrase 'arising out of
and in the course of employment,' which appears
in most workmen's compensation laws, is deceptively simple and litigiously prolific."
The vice of admitting evidence that a defendant
carries insurance is that the jury will then know that an
insurance companiy will pay the judgment. Defendants
contend this is prejudicial from two standpoints. {1)
Supposed prejudice of juries against a large corporation
or an insurance corporation and the likelihood that the
jury would be more apt to return H verdict and a larger
one against such corporation than the individual. (2)
The insurance company representing the defendant and
that will have to pay the judgment does not like to lose
the sympathy which the jury ma.y have for the individual
defendant both as to the matter of the verdict and its
size. Lawyers and insurance companies naturally feel
that the verdict \vill not be as large against an individual
defendant as it would if the jury knew an Insurance
company would have to pay the judgment.
When non-insurance of defendant is introduced it is
the plaintiff who claims a foul has been committed. He
is hopeful that with no mention of insurance the jury
may think (casualty insurance being a common thing)
defendant has insurance and render a verdict accordingly. Then too, if we should start telling the jurors that
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there was no insurance in certain cases they would conclude that when it is not mentioned then the defendant
is insured.
·Obviously these same reasons do not apply in the
case at bar. Whether under workmen's compensation or
F'ederal Employers' Liability Act the railroad will pay.
No one claims, certainly railroad counsel never has, that
there is more ·prejudice against an insurance company
than a railroad company. Both are corporations and
both are considered wealthy.
The purpose to be served by this instruction is to
inform the jury that there is oniy one remedy and the
more familiar worlanen's compensation remedy is not
available to this plaintiff. This instruction allays any
thought that plaintiff has another remedy or should
have pursued another one.
The only prejudice conceivable out of the entire
situation would be the possible prejudice an uninformed
jury might have against a person they mistakenly
thought ha:d gone to court with a elaim against his employer even though said person was entitled to bring
proceedings under workmen's compensation and should
be relegated to that remedy. It was to ·avoid this potential prejudice and to insure a verdict based upon the la'v
and the evidence that the trial court gave cautionary
Instruction No. 12.
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Defendant does not contend that this is an incorrect
statement of the law. It is a cautionary instruction not
to divert but to keep the attention of the jurors on the
issues. Should jurors he the only ones ignorant of a
phase of the law which may play a part in their deliberations~ It was for this same reason that the Court gave its
Instruction No. 20 wherein it stated (R. 311):
"The Railroad Company is not an insurer of
the safety of any of its employees. * * *"
No one contended that it was an insurer. By Instruction.
No. 6 the jurors were instructed to consider the case in
the same manner as between two individuals (R. 298).
These types of instructions are of a cautionary nature.
Their purpose is to direct the jury's views away from
extraneous matters that might in some way

pr~judice

their minds and toward the law and the evidence of the
case at hand in order that justice may he done between
the parties.
This Court has discussed the subject of whether an
instruction, such as the one here involved, is prejudicial
in Br11!1'her v. McCarthy (decided Oct. 25, 1943), 105 Utah
399, 142 P. 2d 649, 655·:
''While instruction 16, in which the jury
was told that the plaintiff was engaged at the
time of the accident in interstate commerce and
that the ease was therefore governed by Federal
rather than State law, may have been unnecessary
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in that the source of the law was not necessarily
·a concern of the jury, it could in no way prejudice·
th~ defendants."
We submit this instruction was properly given and
certainly was not error, prejudicial or otherwise.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INS'TRU·CTION NO. 13.

For the convenience of the Court, we set forth herein
Instruction No. 13 ·(R. 305) :
'''The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides as follows:
" 'That in any action brought .against any
common carrier under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter to recover
damages for injuries to, * * * any of its employees, such employee· shall not be held to
have assumed the risks of his em·ployment in
any case where such injury * * * resulted
in whole or in part from the negligence of any
of the officers, agents, or employees of such
earrier; * * *'."
The foregoing instruction incorporates the e-xact language of 45 U.S.C.A., S.ection 54. That statute in its
present form was enacted into law on August 11, 1939,
and even though the Act in clear and unequivocal terms
eliminated the defense of assumption of risk, various
hostile courts undertook to revive that defense under
other labels, such as that of non-negligence.
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In the case of Tiller v. Atlantic CooJst Line R. Co.,
318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 45'1, 87 L. Ed. 610, the United
States Supreme Court declared:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial
existence as the court below suggests. The theory
that a servant is completely barred from recovery
for injury resulting from his master's negligence,
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all
its various forms of contributory negligence, the
fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk, must
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed
recrudescence under any other label in the common law lexicon."
Counsel state in the Brief of Appellant at page 32
that "whether or not the plaintiff does or does not assume
the risk is immaterial * * *." However, during the trial
the same counsel cross-examined plaintiff as follows
(R. 107) :

''Q. You had seen this particular tire prior to
the time that you went to do this loading, had
you not~
A.

Ye·s.

Q.

And you knew just exactly what kind of tire
you were going to go get~

A.

Yes."

The foregoing cross-examination constituted an invitation to the jury to reason that because plaintiff had
seen this particular tire before and because he knew
exactly what the prohlems were in connection with lift-
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ing and moving the tire he assumed the risks involved.
This was an attempt to revive the doctrine of assumption of risk under a new guise, which was condemned
by the Tiller case.
Counsel took still another step in the face of the
Tille!r case in his requested Instruction No. 8, which became the tria:l court's Instruction No. 22. That instruction reads as follows (R. 312) :
"The plaintiff, Moore, had a duty in his work
for the railroad, to exercise reasonable care for
his own safety. If you believe by a p~reponderance
of the evidence that plaintiff, at the time of his
accident, knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known that the manner in which
he was bracing the tractor tire would or might
result in injury to himself, and that plaintiff
nevertheless p-roceeded or continued to so brace
said tire, then you must fin·d the plaintiff guilty
of negligence in this case."
The foregoing instruction would seem to indicate
that if plaintiff's conduct in bracing the tire ''could or
might result in injury to hin1self" then the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence. Instruction No. 13, however, comes
into play and declares in effect that if Nichols, the Huff
Loader operator, negligently backed the tractor, the
plaintiff would not assmne the risk oeca.sioned by that
incident.
The trial court gave defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 in its Instruction No. 20, wherein it is stated
(R. 3'11) :
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"The Railroad Company is not an insurer of
the safety of any of its ·employees. It is not liable
to respond in damages merely because the plaintiff, Moore, sustained some injury while working
as a section hand or merely because he was employed by the Railroad Company. * * *"
The foregoing is a correct statement of the law. Instruction No. 13 on assumption ·of risk states the converse
of that proposition that although the railroad is not an
insurer, nevertheless neither does the employee assume
risks and dangers in connection with his work which are
occasioned by the negligence of the employer.
It would seem altogether proper that the jury should
be fully instructed on these matters in order that they
not depart from the law as pronounced by the Court to a
speculative reasoning that if a workman does not like
the task to which he is assigned, he is free to quit, and
therefore, if there are dangers in connection with that
task he assumes the risk of those dangers even though
they are occasioned by negligence of the railroad company.
It is our contention and firm belief that in view of
counsel's cross-examination of plaintiff, bringing out
that he had seen this particular tire and was well acquainted with the kind of tire he was ordered to load,
together with Instruction No. 22 to the effect that plaintiff would be negligent if he knew, or should have known,
that the manner in which he was bracing the tractor tire
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would or might result in injury to him, and also InstruCtion No. 20 to the effect that the railroad was not an insurer and that negligence must be proven, demanded and
required Instruction No. 13 to clearly place before the
jury the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. Plaintiff was entitled to a clear-cut instruction that
he ·did not assume the risks occasioned by the negligence
of Nichols, the Huff Loader operator.
Instruet1ons similar to Instruction No. 13 have been
considered by a number of courts. In Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Burkett (decided Nov. 16·, 1951, 5th Cir.),
19'2 F . 2d 941, 943 plaintiff was injured when he fell over
a pile of scrap iron and other debris while helping a fellow workman carry a rail. The trial court charged the
jury as follows:
'''

:!(~

* * 'I charge you further, gentlemen of

the jury, that in any action brought against any
common carrier under or by virtue of any of the
provisions of this chapter to recover damages for
injuries to any of its emploiJees, such employee
shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his
employment in .any case where such injury resulted in whole· or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or en1ployees of such
carrier.' ''
The F'ifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the giving of said instruction in the following language (p. 943) :
"Under the pleadings and evidence in this
case, we think that the trial judge was justified
in thinking that in the absence of a cl1arge on as-
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sumption of risk, the jury might have considered
that defense under the guise of nonnegligence.
As said in the Tiller case, supra (318 U.S. 54,
63 S. Ct. 447) :
" 'Unless great care be taken, the servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply
charging him with assumption of risk under
another name.' "
In Curtis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (decided
Dec. 8, 1952), 253 S. W. 2d 789, 79·4, the Supreme Court
of Missouri stated:
"Defendant complains of instruction 6 which
in substance informed the jury that the suit was
based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
concluded by advising the jury that the deceased
'S hall not be held to have assumed the risks of
his employment.' Defendant says this instruction
injected a foreign issue into the case. The. cases
cited in support of defendant's contention are
cases such a.s Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co., 331
Mo. 73, 52 S.W. 2d 809, where the court held it
was error for the court to give an instruction for
the defendant which injected contributory negligence in a humanitarian case as a defense·. Such
cases are not in point.
1

"We have had cases sin1ilar to the one now
·before us. See Ford v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 355
Mo. 362, 196 s. W. 2d 163, loc. cit. 168 (7) (8),
where we held that such an instruction did not
inject a foreign issue into the case. In Abernathy
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo. Sup., 237
S.W. 2d 161, loc. cit. 163(2), we held that such
an instruction tended to keep a foreign issue out
of the case.
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"Plaintiff's principal instruction authorized
a plaintiff's verdict only if the jury found deceased came to his death through the negligence
of the defendant. A defendant's instruction told
the jury that the burden was on plaintiff to prove
her case ; that the defendant under the F'ederal
Act was not an insurer of the safety of its employees ; also that the mere fact Curtis was injured did not authorize a verdict for plaintiff.
In the circumstances, we hold the giving of instruction 6 was not prejudicially erroneous."
In the ease of _Meierotto v. Thompson (S. Ct. of
Mo., decided Mar. 10, 19;47), 201 S·.W. 2d 161, an action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal
injury, it appeared ·that while plaintiff was attempting
to make repairs to a pip·e carrying exhaust steam into
the water tank of an engine, he had suffered physical
in·juries when water rushed out of the pipe with great
force, throwing dirt and grease about his face. The trial
-court gave an instruction on assumption of risk in substantially the same language a.s did this Court in Instruction No. 13. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
that the giving of the instruction did not constitute error.
See also Laughter v. Powell (S. Ct. N.C., decided May
13, 19·41), 219 N.C. 6S9, 14 S.E. 2·d 826 (Petition for Writ
of Certiorari denied by United S:tates Supreme Court
62 S. Ct. 128).
Not only was the giving of Instruction No. 13 particularly appropriate under the facts and circumstances
of this case, but the giving of such an instruction in any
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case could in no way prejudice a defendant railroad
com·pany where an action is brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
Counsel for defendant has quoted from the Brwner
case supra, but has not included the entire statement
of this Court on the subject (p. 655) :
'''The same holds true as to instruction 11
on the 'assumption of risk' doctrine. No such issue
was raised by the pleadings or the evidence and
no good purpose could have been served by the
giving of such an instruction. Yet this could not
be prejudicial to the defendants, for even if the
jury inferred from the giving of such an instruction that the doctrine of 'assumption of risk' applied, the defendants could not have been prejudiced. If they had thought that the plaintiff had
possibly assumed the risk, it would have been to
the defendants' benefit not to their disadvantage·
or prejudice."
POINT IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTAT-ED BY PASSION OR
PREJUDICE.

No contention

IS

made in the Brief of Appellant

that the jury was guilty of any act of misconduct or that
counsel was guilty of any conduct calculated to or having the effect of inflaming the minds of the jury.
The sole ·claim is that the amount of the verdict in
view of the evidence of injury and damage established
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that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice.
The governing considerations on this issue have been
clearly defined by this Court in Pauly v. McCarthy et ,al.,
109 Utah 39'8, 184 P. 2d 123, 126, 127, where it is stated:
'"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
·been given under the influence- of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a
motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D.
& R. G. Ry. Co., sup·ra, and other cases cited above
following that decision. But mere excessiveness
of a verdict, without more, does not necessarily
show that the verdict was arrived at by passion or
prHjudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. U.
P. Ry. ~Co., supra. It is true that the verdict might
be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to
the injury that we could say from that fact alone
that as a matter of law the verdict must have
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the
facts must be such that the excess can be determined as a matter of law, or the verdict must be
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. McAffee v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; Ward v. D. &
R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This is not such a case.
,, 'The verdict here was admittedly liberal.
But the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court Inight have given,
or even more than the evidence justified, does
not conclusively show that it was the result of
passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of
the jury.

* *

*

*
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"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
·so. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46·, 21 P. 2d 865. The present cost of living and the diminished purchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. 'Coke v Timby,
57 Utah 53, 19'2 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union
Ry. & Depot C·o., sup·ra.
"We can discover nothing in this case, except the amount of the verdict, which indi'cates
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred
from an excessive verdict, without more. No exce·ption was taken to the jury or any member
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury,
evincing passion and prejudice has been called
to our attention. The only point of complaint is
the size of verdict."
The Court went on to say (p·. 1'25):

·"* * * But, although we have the power to
order a new trial in case of an excessive verdict,
it is a power which we have rarely, if ever, exercised."
~counsel

for defendant, throughout the Brief of Appellant, has cast the evidence in a light most favorable
to the defendant. For example, counsel has stated at
page 35 of their ·brief that Moore's employment before
his injury was unsteady. Moore is only qualified by
education and experience to work as a laboring man.
T'he labor market is a shifting market. Many types of
employment are seasonal. The evidence reveals that
Moore had an excellent work record from the time he
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left the tenth grade of school to the date of his in·jury.
He isn't the kind of man who would lay around. When
one job terminated he found another (R. 9-1'2).
ICounsel states at page 37 of his brief:
'·'On the evening of the alleged injury Moore
asked his foreman, F·oster, for a 30 day leave of
a;bsenee to put up his hay (R.. 209·-·210, compare
with R. 112)."
~Moore

testified that he did not ask for such a leave

of absence (R. 112). Furthermore, no leave of absence
wa.s offered in evidence hy defendant to substantiate the
biased witness, Foster's, testimony. The jury found in
Moore's favor on this issue.
~C'ounsel

suggests at page 38 of his brief that Moore

'·'was boxing with the high school boys" during the F'all
of 1951. Moore, of course, testified that he did not box
with the boys (R. 124). App·arently counsel has the impression that this app·ellate court should determine the
credibility of witnesses.
~Counsel

su·ggests at p·age 38 of his brief:

~'In

May of 195·3, Moore went to work for the
'Cater Construction Co. and worked ten and onehalf hours per day at least five days per week
doi~g extremely heavy manual labor (hauling and
sett1ng poles) and yet never complained about his
hack (Ex. 9, R. 317)."
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~The

foregoing statement is contrary to the evidence
most favorable to Moore which is, that he was unable
to work steady because of his back condition, and that
during an ordinary work week he would work two or
three days and lay off a few days (R. 149·, 150).
Counsel states at page 41 of his brief:
''No
proved."

medical

expenses

were

alleged

or

It is true that plaintiff did not pray for medical expenses in his complaint. This does not mean, however,
that he was not receiving medical care and treatment.
The evidence is that Moore received treatments from
Dr. Thomas N. Sims, at Eagle, Colorado, on several
occasions shortly after his injuries (R. 224, 225). That
in January of 1952 he sought medical care and treatment from Dr. Livingston, at Glenwood S:prings, who
advised him not to lift more than five or ten pounds for
a year (R. 38, 39). That in February or March of 1952
he sought assistance fron1 Dr. Nutting at Glenwood
Springs, Colorado (R. 40). That in March of 1952 he
sought 1nedical assistance and treatment from Dr. Hines,
at Denver, Colorado, and that Dr. Hines turned him
over to Dr. Ellis, an orthopedic surgeon, who advised
the use of a eanvas belt with heavy stays (R. 42). That
thereafter he sought assistance· from Dr. Hoover, an
orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Fuller, at Salida, Colorado;
that during this time he was wearing the canvas belt
and taking hot baths for his back condition (R. 43). That
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he also sought medical assistance from Dr. Newman, an
orthope~dic surgeon, a.t Denver, Colorado, and Dr. Grant
Young, an orthopedist from Denver, Colorado (R. 44).
During the two years and ten months between his
injury and the second trial, Moore had seen a total of
ten ·doctors in an effort to obtain relief for his back
condition.
'Counsel for defendant makes the following statement at page 37 of his brief:
"The undisputed evidence including plaintiff's own medical testimony, however, directly
opp~oses the conclusion that Moore was seriously
injured."
A review of the evidence indicates the fallacy of
couns·el's statement.
[twill be recalled that Moore was injured on August
9, 19·5,1, when he suffered a severe strain to his back. He
was able, with some difficulty, to continue with his work
until the end of the shift (R. 34). He complained to his
fellow workmen and to his assistant foren1an that he
h'ad injured his back. That evening he had extreme difficulty sleeping (R,. 3'5). The second work day following
his injury he filed an accident report and received a slip
to be examined by Dr. Sims, at Eagle, Color:ado (R. 36,
37). The doctor found a "lesion" or "deviation" from
the normal of the right hip (R. 224, 225). For a p·eriod
of four to six weeks thereafte-r he would ''work a day
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or two and have to lay off" (R. 37). After four to six
weeks he was forced to lay off work altogether (R. 37).
F'rom that time until the second trial Moore had been
in constant quest of relief for the condition of his hack.
He had "practically worn out" a -canvas back support.
He had been sleeping on the floor in a sleeping hag because of his back condition. He had worked only sporadically. He was forced to terminate his employment with
the railroad -company because of his back condition.
After working for Vern Davis approximately two months
he was forced to quit because of his back condition (R.
48, 126). After working for Cater Construction Company three months he was forced to quit because he was.
unable to work steady (R. 48, 130). Although he remained employed by D-eardon Lumber Company for a
period of eight and one-half months, he was unable to
work steady because of his back condition (R. 49, 150).
On several occasions Moore had actually passed out on
the job because of his back condition. On one occasion
he had fallen against a saw and cut his hand (R. 50, 51).
He \Vas employed by the Decker Trucking Company,
Green River, Utah, at the time of trial, but testified he
was having extreme difficulty with his back and wondered how long he would be able to continue in that employment (R. 53).
Dr. Clegg testified that the history of injury and
symptoms coupled with the muscle spasm, the x-ray
changes in the area of the lumbosacral joint, the history
of exacerbations and remissions which had been char-
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acteristic of Moore's hack since his injury fit the patter~
of a disc injury. It is also interesting to note Dr. Clegg's
testimony that Moore had one..:half inch atrophe of the
right leg (R. 70) in the light of his furth·er testimony
that Moore had a sensory loss on the medial side of his
right foot indicating nerve root p-ressure, and Moore's
own testimony that ever since his injury he had suffered
from numbness and pain extending down his right leg.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing circumstances the
narrowing of the interspace at the lumbosacral joint
becomes extremely significant. The doctor gave his opinion that Moore had a five per cent permanent

p1art~al

d:isability of his back (R. 6'2-67). He further stated that

subsequent exacerbations and remissions could be· expected; that lifting would be the most difficult activity
for Moore in view of his hack condition (R. 78).
The jury had every right to believe from the foregoing evidence that Moore had suffered extensive physical pain since his injury. The jury had every right to
believe that he would continue to suffer frorn physical
pain in the future. Moore had a wife and adopted child.
The jury had a right to believe that his physical injury,
the long p·eriod of

ina~bility

to earn a livelihood because

of his physical. condition, and the worry over whether
he woul.d be able to earn a livelihood for himself and
his family, had caused and would continue to cause him
to suffer mental pain.
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·Concerning the evidence of loss of bodily function,
we call attention to the fact that Moore suffered a permanent partial disability of his back amounting to 5%.
It will be recalled that he had enjoyed excellent health
and a perfect body before he was injured.
'Counsel has suggested in his brief (p'. 41) :
·"Had t'he jury believed all of Moore's testimony, we feel that they could not have awarded
in excess of $1,000.00 for loss of wages."
~The

evidence, however, is contrary to counsel's hopeful suggestion.
During the seventeen months that Moore had been
working steadily for The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company prior to his injury he was earning
an average of $256.00 per month (R. 13). During the
two years and ten months between his injury and the
second trial Moore earned the following amounts :
The D·enver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company____ $ 100.00
Vern Davis ------------------------------------ 400.00
·Cater Construction Company ___ _ 500.00
Deardon Lumber Company _______ _ 1,000.00
Decker Trucking Company -------- 390.00
TotaL _______________________ $2,390. 00
~Average

monthly income $70.'29, on average loss of

monthly income of 185.71.
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If Moore had continued his employment with The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
which was his intention, during the same p,eriod he would
have earned $'256.00 per month, or a total of $8,704.00.
Consequently the jury -could well have found, and no
doubt did find, that his lost earnings at the time of trial
were approximately $6,314.00.
·Likewise, the jury was entitled to find that Moore
would continue to suffer from diminution in his earning
capa;city throughout his life expectancy.
In Schl,atter v. McCarthy et al., (decided Aug. 2'3,
1948), 113 Utah 543, 19·6 P. 2d 9·68, 973, the Court stated:

"* * * The extent of the disability to a limb
or other part of the human machine is not generally the measure of the extent of the impairment
of earning capacity. A few examples will illustrate: A 50% permanent disability of the left
hand of a practicing lawyer would probably not
imp·air his earning capacity to the extent of 50%.
He would still be able to interview clients, to read
cases, to walk to and from the court room, and
to p!erform all of the other duties ordinarily incident to the practice of his profession. ·On the
other hand, a 50% permanent disability of the
left hand of a concert pianist "\vould probably
amount to a total impairment of his earning
capacity. So also, permanent disfiguring injuries, even of a slight nature, might result in almost total impairment of earning capacity of a
professional actress or model, whereas serious
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disfigurement, unless a.ccon1pa.nied by loss of
bodily function, would hardly impair at all the
earning capacity of a day laborer."
'The evidence was that Moore had only a tenth grade
education; that during his lifetime he had pursued only
those tasks involving strenuous physical exertion, and
requiring a strong solid hack. He had worked handling
shipments, feeding cattle, pitching hay, handling spike
maul and shovel, driving truck and as a lumberjack.
His qualifications limited him to heavy manual labor
tasks. It is true that a lawyer, doctor or musician might
very well have had no diminution in his earning capacity
from an injury such as that which Moore sustained, but
this is the case of Alfred Roger Moore. The evidence
fully justified a finding that he had sustained a serious.
and permanent impairment in his earning capacity. At
the time of trial Moore "\vas 34 years of age, and according to the Commissioner's 1941 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, had an expectancy of life of 34.29 years
(R. 309).
Using the foregoing life expectancy and discounting
at 3¥2% interest, it would take the sum of $11,964.00
to pay Moore $50.00 per month for the remainder of his
expected life.
Nobody has an unvariable measuring rod for the
money value of loss of future earnings, pain and suffering, or loss of bodily function. This is the very reason
why such matters are and should be left under proper
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instruction to the sound discretion of the jury. We suggest the following figures merely as one reasonable way
justified by the evidence that the jury ·could have arrived
at their verdict:
·Loss of past earnings ----------·------$ 6,314.00
Past pain and suffering,
physical an·d mental -------------- 7,500.00
Loss. of future earnings ------------ 11,964.00
($50.00 p·er month discounted
at 3-lh% interest over life
expectancy of 34.29 years)
Future pain and suffering,
mental and physical -------------- 4,611.00
·Loss of bodily function,
past and future ---------------------- 4,611.00
TotaL __________________________ .$35,000.00
In Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah, decided
May 17, 1950), 118 Utah 82, 218 P. 2d 1080, this Court
recognized its power to require a remittitur or a new
trial where a jury's verdict appeared to have been given
under the influenc-e of p~assion and prejudice. This
Court has exercised that right but very sparingly especially wh·ere it app·ears that the trial court has denied
a motion for new trial on the ground of excessiveness
of the verdict.
The trial court in the case at bar denie-d the motion
for a new trial thereby placing its stamp of approval
upon the amount of the verdict return-e-d by the jury.
1
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~As

stated in Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co., v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 52:8, 161 Pac. 459, 462:

"* * * Necessarily upon such a question appellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon
the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
That court is in a much better position to observe
and determine whether a jury was actuated by
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mistaken with regard to the amount that should have
been allowed."
'Counsel for defendant come to this Court almost
four years after plaintiff was injured and following two
adverse verdicts, making ·fhe claim that the jury's verdict was motivated by passion and prejudice, and that
the trial court was guilty of abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Under these circumstances
the language of Jensern v. Denver and R. G. R. Co., 44
Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 1192, is particularly appropriate:
"Neither is either party on that question (on
damages) entitled to the judgment of the court
below in a case of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to that, are entitled to the unprejudiced
judgment of the jury. That is exclusively within
their province. Their power and discretion, when
prop·erly exercised and when they have been properly directed as to the measure of damages and
the mode of assessing it, may not be interfered
with merely because the court above or below
may think the amount rendered is too large, or
even may think it appears to be larger than the
evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court,
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va~cating a verdict and granting a new trial by

merely setting up his opinion or judgment against
that of the jury, but usurps judicial power and
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury. Still
the jury cannot be. permitted to go unbridled and
unchecked. Hence the Code that a new trial on
motion of the aggrieved party may be granted
hy the court below on the ground of 'excessive
damages ap:pearing to have been given unde-r the
influence of p~assion or prejudice.' Whenever that
is made to appear, the court, when its action is
properly invoked, should require a remission or
set the verdict aside and grant a new trial. B~t,
before the court is justified to do that, it should
clearly be made to ap·p·ear that the jury totally
mistook or disregarded the rules of law by whieh
the damages were to be regulated, or wholly miscon'ceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by
so doing committed gross and palpable error by
rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous
or unjust as to be attributable to neither the
charge nor the evidence, but only to passion or
prejudice. Whether a new trial should or should
not be granted on this ground, of necessity, must
largely rest within the sound discretion of the
trial court."
1

A thought is suggested by Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in Bentr~tett v. Denver & Rio Grande
West-ern R. Co., 117 Utah 57, 213 P. 2d 32·5.
We submit that more \Vas taken off for contributory
negligence than vvas justified by the evidence. The jury
found that fifty p·er cent of the negligence \vas that of
plaintiff. The net verdi'Ct was $17,500. Justice Wolfe
in his opinion stated as follows (p. 332):
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"Also, it is quite possible that the jury may
have taken too much from the verdict for the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. And from
this the plaintiff has no recourse. It is quite
likely that the jury looks at these eases realisticaHy by determining what net amount the plaintiff should receive to see him decently through
life and then makes the verdict high enough so
that its guess as to the amount the plaintiff should
be penalized for his contributory negligence when
substracted (sic) will bring the verdict to the
amount they think he should receive. Of course,
such mental operations cannot he proved and are
not in accord with the purpose of the act, but it
is very difficult to prevent a jury from so arriving at a verdict in this fashion. And if so, as
before stated, the amount which t he jury may subtract for contributory negligence, if it finds there
was such, may be excessive but the net verdict
may itself be not out of the way.
1

"Present verdicts doubtless seem very high
in view of past experience in this state, but it is
just as valid a conclusion that injured men may
have been awarded too little in the past as it is
that they are awarded too much now. Perhaps
both are the cas-e. In view of present cost of living and continuing inflation, I cannot say that
the verdict is excessive."
The verdict here comes with the stamp of approval
of the District Court and theTe is nothing to show that
the verdict resulted from passion or prejudice and if
the jury gave credence, which they must have done, to
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the testimony of plaintiff regarding the extent and seriousness of his injuries, then the verdict returned is not
e:xcess1ve.

·This case has now been tried twice. The verdict in
the first trial was for $12,000. The case was again tried
and a net verdict in favor of plaintiff returned in the
amount o:f $17,500.

D·efendant makes no contention that the evidence
1s not sufficient to permit a finding by the jury that
defendant was negligent in that the

op~erator

of the Huff

loader permitted it. to hack up because of a failure to
keep the brake on. The only assignments of error relate
to instructions given. or refused and to a claimed excessiveness of the verdict.
We submit that under the foregoing cases and authorities there is no prejudicial error present. Under
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is necessary
that the alleged error be inconsistent with substantial
justice and it must affect the substantial rights of the
parties. We submit that any errors assigned do not come
within this rule. We believe that the damages assessed
by the jury are not excessive and that certainly no bias
or prejudice can be attributed to the verdict of the jury.
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We submit the judgment appealed from and which
has the approval of the District Court, should be affirmed.
Respectfuily submitted,
RAWLINGS~,

WALLACE
ROBERT S & BLA,CK
1

Cownsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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